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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY-FORMER JEOPARDY. Two
indictments against D were presented, both alleging conspiracy to
violate the same federal laws; times of the alleged violations over-
lapped. Of numerous named defendants, D was the only one charged
in both indictments. In the first indictment tried, evidence involving
D and defendants named in the second indictment was introduced.
D contended that this evidence was inadmissible and might be used
only to show the second offense. The evidence was barred, and D
was acquitted because the remaining evidence was insufficient to
connect him with the conspiracy. In this trial on the second indict-
ment, D now pleads former jeopardy claiming that the prior trial
was for the same offense. The court held, that not only had D failed
to meet the burden of proof that he had been tried and acquitted of
the same offense, but also he was estopped to so claim since the ac-
quittal had been obtained on his contention that the conspiracies were
separate offenses. Reid v. United States, 177 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1949).
The doctrine of former jeopardy' in American courts flows out of
the provision of the Constitution stating " . . . nor shall any person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and
limb.. ."2 and similar provisions found in state constitutions.' This con-
stitutional immunity can, however, be waived.' After the defendant
has proved that he has been placed in jeopardy on a prior occasion,
the primary question is whether the defendant is being tried for the
second time for the same offense.'
To determine identity of the offense a minority of state courts adopt
the "same transaction" test whereby a person cannot be convicted of
several offenses when they are a part of the same criminal trans-
action.' The broader test applied in the instant case is employed by
the federal courts and a majority of the state courts including North
Dakota.' By this "same evidence" test the second indictment is barred
when the evidence necessary to support it would have been sufficient
to ground a prior conviction had such evidence been admitted in the
first proceeding.' The authorities are not, however, agreed in the
Former jeopardy is defined as that status which attaches to a person when
he is put on trial, before a court of competent jurisdiction, on an indict-
ment, presentment or information which is sufficient in form and sub-
stance to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his de-
liverance, O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 9 Bush 333 (Ky. 1872).
U.S. Const. Amend. V.
3 E.g. N.D. Const. Art. I, § 13.
4 This waiver may be express or implied. For specific instances see 1 Bishop,
Criminal Law § 988 (9th ed. 1923).
5 2 Wharton, Criminal Procedure § 1426 n.5 (10th ed. 1918).
Note, 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 79, 81 (1937).
State v. Panchuk, 53 N.D. 669, 207 N.W. 991 (1926); State v. Virgo,
14 N.D. 293, 103 N.W. 610 (1910).
Hall, Cases and Readings on Criminal Law and Procedure 902 (1949);
Note, 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 79. 81 (1937). The order of the test has at
times been reversed to read ". . . whether the facts necessary to support
the first indictment would warrant a conviction under the second . .
Note, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 642 (1907).
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method of application of this rule.' The well-reasoned case of Short
v. United States expresses the view that since the prosecution for
conspiracy is for the criminal agreement, a continuing offense which
becomes a crime upon the commission of a single overt act, one prose-
cution for conspiracy should be a bar to a subsequent conspiracy
charge, although the second indictment may be distinguishable in
part." Another line of authorities exemplified by the case of Ferra-
cane v. United States' - requires a higher degree of proof by the de-
fendant that the offenses charged are the same; these authorities re-
fuse to find former jeopardy when there are any material discrepan-
cies in the charges against the defendant."
Elements considered in determining whether charges constitute one
or more than one conspiracy are time, place, parties, overt acts, and
statutes violated.'" Where times of the alleged conspiracies are over-
lapping in part" or different'" it has been held that prosecution on
one of the charges is not a bar to prosecution on the other. A prosecu-
tion for a conspiracy in one location has been held not to be a bar to
a prosecution for that conspiracy in another location."0 Variance of
parties has likewise resulted in divergent holdings. The Ferracane
case, contra to the Short case, holds that where parties named in the
indictments are for the greater part different, the two indictments are
for separate offenses unless the defendant can show through other
evidence that the offenses are the same in fact." Courts likewise differ
upon the effect of differing over acts, the Short case holding that if
the different acts are part of one conspiracy, there can be only one
conviction, while other courts hold that such different overt acts con-
stitute two separate offenses." Also there is substantial authority to
Note, 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 79, 80 (1937).
W 91 F.2d 614 (1937); Accord, United States v. Weiss, 293 Fed. 992 (N.D.
Ill. 1923).
See Ferracane v. United States, 29 F.2d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 1928) (dissent-
ing opinion); see Note, 112 A.L.R. 983 (1938).
2 29 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1928).
See also Henry v. United States, 15 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1926).
See Note. 112 A. L. R. 983, 989 (1938).
" Francis v. United States, 152 Fed. 155 (3d Cit. 1907); cf. Henry v. Unit-
ed States, 15 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1926); Gallagher v. People, 211 I1l. 158,
71 N.E. 842, 1904), writ of error dismissed, 203, U.S. 600 (1906), hold-
ing that the matter of time was considered by the jury in determining
whether the offenses were the same.
06 Johnson v. United States, 124 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1941); Wainer v. United
States, 82 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1936); United States v. Swift, 186 Fed.
1002 (N.D. Ill. 1911).
00 Davidson v. United States, 63 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1933); Contra: Short v.
United States, 91 F.2d 614 (1937).
Henry v. United States, 15 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1926); Gallagher v. People.
211 I11. 158, 71 N.E. 842 (1904), writ of error dismissed, 203 U.S. 600
(1906).
Piquit v. United States, 81 F.2d 75 (1936); Henry v. United States.
15 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1926); Francis v. United States, 152 Fed. 15 (3d
.Cir. 1907).
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the effect that, where there has been a conspiracy to violate more
than one statute, a trial for conspiracy to violate one does not bar a
prosecution for a conspiracy to violate the others.2 Respectable auth-
ority may, however, be found to support a view to the contrary."
In the foregoing cases the courts have been unable to formulate a
hard and fast rule which will guarantee justice in all situations. Al-
though the "same evidence" test is probably the better rule for de-
ciding identity of offenses in most criminal cases, it is possible that
an application of the "same transaction" test would produce better re-
sults in conspiracy cases. As pointed out in the Short case, the prose-
cution is for the criminal agreement or transaction and not for the
specific overt acts. Since the prosecution is for the agreement, a slight
divergence in the evidence or the time, place, parties, overt acts, or
statutes violated should not give rise to numerous prosecutions for the
same conspiracy.
The question of identity of offenses involving divergent factual situ-
ations does not lend itself to determination -by strict rules of law. It
is probable that more just results would be obtained by freeing the
courts from such rules and allowing them discretion in deciding the
question on the basis of broad principles of public policy.' However,
the court in the principal case is correct in placing on the defendant
the burden of proving that the former prosecution was for the same
offense" and in holding that the defendant will not be heard to criti-
cize a judgment which he insisted should be granted.'
Wilmar Pewsey
TORTS-ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-ARTIFICIAL POOLS OF
WATER AS ATTRACTIVE NUISANCES. Defendant, a land owner
in an area frequented by children, dug an uneven excavation near a
public street. He allowed water to collect, thus creating a pond vary-
ing in depth from a few inches to more than eight feet. P's son, an
eleven-year-old boy, was drowned while wading in the pool when he
stepped into a depression. P sued for damages on the theory the pond
was an attractive nuisance. In dismissing the suit, the Supreme Court
of Indiana held, with two judges dissenting,' that such artificial pools
Lewis v. United States, 4 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1925); United States v.
Owen, 21 F.2d 868 (N.D. Ill. 1927).
-1 Manning v. United States. 275 Fed. 29 (8th Cir. 1921); United States
v. Weiss, 293 Fed. 992 (N.D. Ill. 1923).
-- Hall, op. cit. supra note 9, at 908.
Johnson v. United States, 124 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1941); Kastel v. United
States, 23 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1927).
' Haugen v. United States, 153 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1946); United
States v. Jones, 31 Fed. 725 (S.D. Ga. 1887).
The dissenting judges stated that when there is an affirmative act done
by man which creates a body of water, that man must use due care under
the circumstances to avoid injury to others. The excavation attracted the
infant and there was a duty on the part of the defendant to act affirma-
tively to avoid injury. The condition was likened to a trap.
